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SentrAI Roadmap

From the working hackathon MVP (27 Sep 2026) to a product a Singapore SME or private school can run in production.

← Home · Full plan · MVP code

How to read this: 9 phases, each with a goal, the features it adds, a done-when check, the owner, and a rough effort in developer-days for one developer (Erick). Effort figures are estimates made from the current codebase, not measurements; treat them as ±50%. Phases 2 to 6 can overlap once Phase 1 is done.


Where we are today (MVP, done)

Area In the MVP Still simulated or missing
Data collection Web, DB and OS logs from the demo portal via a Python collector Real servers, Windows, network, cloud
Classification Rules engine + fallback heuristic; Jev client written Jev never called live (no API key); no accuracy measurement
Risk engine 0 to 100 index, inaction penalty, SLA, bands, threshold Per-organization settings, on-duty roster
Containment IP block and account lock via the portal’s blocklist (real 403), TTL, rollback, make permanent Firewall, WAF, AD, DB, cloud actions are only recorded; no tarpit or honeytokens
Agents Warden, Gatehouse, Vault, Garrison, Countersign, Watchdog, Scribe, HelpDesk as Python classes in one process Separate services, separate keys, LLM-assisted HelpDesk
Notifications Dashboard, console, Telegram code with buttons Telegram untested live; no email, SMS, Teams/Slack
Accountability Hash-chained audit log, security evidence report (Markdown/JSON/PDF) Signatures, fair-process features, board reporting
Platform Runs on one Windows laptop; in-memory state; no login Persistence, auth, multi-tenant, installer, CI

Timeline at a glance

Phase Name Effort (dev-days) Target window
0 Finish the hackathon 2 28–29 Sep 2026
1 Harden the core 10 Oct wk 1–2
2 Real data collection on every layer 18 Oct wk 2 – Nov wk 1
3 AI classification that can be trusted 10 Oct wk 3 – Nov wk 1
4 Real containment and tripwires 16 Nov
5 Notifications and escalation 7 Nov (parallel)
6 Accountability and evidence reporting 9 Nov – Dec wk 1
7 Agents as separate services 12 Dec
8 Product, pilot and security of SentrAI itself 21 Jan – Feb 2027
  Total ≈ 105 dev-days ≈ 5 months for one developer
Sep   Oct               Nov               Dec          Jan–Feb 2027
P0 ■
      P1 ■■■■
          P2 ■■■■■■■■
            P3 ■■■■■
                        P4 ■■■■■■■
                        P5 ■■■
                            P6 ■■■■
                                          P7 ■■■■■
                                                       P8 ■■■■■■■■

Critical path: P1 (persistence + auth) → P2 (real collectors) → P4 (real containment) → P8 (pilot). Everything else can slip without blocking the pilot.


Phase 0 · Finish the hackathon (28–29 Sep)

Goal: submit a strong video. No new product features.

Task Owner
Build the PowerPoint deck from mvp/pitch/SLIDES.md (scripts in mvp/deck/) Hozen, Erick
Generate video title cards and charts (mvp/assets/make_assets.py) Erick
Add a “Why SentrAI” competitor slide (Darktrace/Defender, PagerDuty, Vanta vs SentrAI) Ishmail
Reframe the “Negligence Dossier” as a Security Evidence Report in the pitch Ishmail
Record the demo with run_demo.ps1 -DemoSpeed 600 and scenario.py --pause 40; keep a replay take as backup Erick
Optional: try Jev live with a TypeSafe key and Telegram live with a bot token Erick

Done when: video submitted; deck and repo links on the submission.


Phase 1 · Harden the core (≈10 days)

Goal: SentrAI survives restarts, knows who is using it, and every change is tested automatically.

# Feature Detail Days
1.1 Persistence Store incidents, actions, notifications and events in SQLite (Postgres option). Restore state on restart, including active TTLs. 3
1.2 Authentication and roles API tokens for collectors and the notifier; operator login for the dashboard; roles: Operator, Team Lead, IT Manager, Executive, Auditor (read-only). Only Operators+ can approve; only Auditors+ can export reports. 3
1.3 Organization settings A settings file / page: risk threshold, SLA, TTL, penalty rate and cap, protected IPs and users, escalation contacts. Every change is written to the audit chain. 1.5
1.4 On-duty roster Shifts and who is on duty, so “Responsible Entity” in reports comes from the roster, not an env var. 1
1.5 CI and quality GitHub Actions: run the 74 existing tests + e2e on every push; lint; dependency audit (pip-audit). 1
1.6 Contract v2 Fold the extra endpoints (/heartbeat, /agents, /why, /demo/advance) and the notification item shape into CONTRACT.md; version the event schema. 0.5

Done when: killing and restarting core mid-incident keeps the incident, penalty and active blocks; an unauthenticated request to any write endpoint gets 401; CI is green on main.

Depends on: nothing. Unblocks: everything.


Phase 2 · Real data collection on every layer (≈18 days)

Goal: monitor real servers, not just the demo portal (plan section 4).

# Feature Detail Days
2.1 Agent framework One collector codebase with plug-in sources, local buffering to disk, TLS to core, per-agent token, heartbeat, config pulled from core, schema version. 3
2.2 Linux OS source /var/log/auth.log, journald, auditd (execve by web user, new SUID files), open ports via ss, process tree via psutil. 3
2.3 Windows OS source Event Log: 4625 failed logon, 4688 process creation, 4720 user created, 4732 admin group change; optional Sysmon. Runs as a Windows service. 3
2.4 Web source Nginx/Apache access logs, ModSecurity audit log. 1.5
2.5 Database source PostgreSQL pgaudit + pg_stat_activity; MySQL audit log. Bulk-read and privilege-grant detection. 2
2.6 Network source Suricata eve.json (alerts, flows) and optional Zeek; port-scan and beaconing rules. 2
2.7 Cloud config scan AWS via boto3: public S3 buckets, security groups open to 0.0.0.0/0 on admin ports, IAM users without MFA. Scheduled scan, read-only role. Azure/GCP later. 3
2.8 Asset inventory Hosts, owners and criticality (1.0 / 1.5 PII / 2.0 crown jewels) managed in core, so criticality is no longer hard-coded in collectors. 0.5

Done when: a Linux VM, a Windows VM, a Postgres DB and an AWS test account all report into one SentrAI; each layer’s example attack from plan section 5 opens the right incident.

Depends on: 1.1, 1.2. Later: rewrite the collector in Go or Rust as a single binary (plan section 13), ≈8 extra days, only after the Python version is stable.


Phase 3 · AI classification that can be trusted (≈10 days)

Goal: prove Jev’s accuracy before letting it influence autonomous actions (plan section 6).

# Feature Detail Days
3.1 Jev live Run with a TypeSafe API key; tune the Choice criteria text; log latency and cost per call. 1
3.2 Evaluation set Labelled events from CSIC 2010 (web attacks) and CIC-IDS2017 (network), plus our own lab logs. Report precision, recall and false-positive rate per category for rules, Jev and fallback. 3
3.3 Confidence calibration Check that Jev’s probabilities match reality; adjust the 0.5–1.0 clip and the 0.4–0.6 “needs review” band from data. 1.5
3.4 Needs-review queue Dashboard view for uncertain events; operator verdict (attack / benign) is stored as a label. 1.5
3.5 Feedback loop Use operator verdicts to add rules and improve the criteria descriptions; track accuracy over time. 1
3.6 Claude for explanations (System 2) Claude writes the plain-English explanation and report narrative from the incident record only. It never scores or executes. Cached, rate-limited, with a template fallback. 2

Done when: a published accuracy table exists; false-positive rate on benign traffic is under an agreed target (proposed: under 1% of benign events open an incident); autonomous actions only use rules or Jev results above the calibrated threshold.

Depends on: 2.x for real data (the eval set can start in parallel).


Phase 4 · Real containment and tripwires (≈16 days)

Goal: replace “recorded (simulated)” actions with real, reversible enforcement, and add the tripwires (plan sections 8 and 11). Every adapter follows the same contract: dry-run → snapshot → apply with TTL → verify → rollback.

# Feature Detail Days
4.1 Enforcement adapter framework Common interface, dry-run mode, per-adapter allowlist, protected assets, automatic rollback if verification or a health check fails. 2
4.2 Linux firewall nftables / iptables rule with comment tag and TTL, run by the Linux agent. 1.5
4.3 Windows firewall netsh advfirewall / Windows Firewall API, run by the Windows agent. 1.5
4.4 WAF and rate limit ModSecurity rule and Nginx limit_req snippets, reloaded safely. 2
4.5 Account actions Disable/re-enable a local, Active Directory or Entra ID account; revoke a DB role or kill a DB session. 2.5
4.6 Cloud actions S3 Block Public Access, security-group rule revoke, with the previous policy saved for rollback. 1.5
4.7 Tarpit Slow down connections from a flagged IP instead of dropping them (makes attacks expensive). 1
4.8 Honeypot login and honeytokens A decoy admin page and fake DB rows / credentials; any touch is a near-certain alert with confidence 1.0. 2
4.9 Evidence pack for SingCERT / police Export of the incident, raw events and audit-chain proof with a chain-of-custody sheet. No contact with the attacker’s systems, ever. 2

Done when: on the test VMs, each playbook applies, verifies, expires on its TTL and rolls back cleanly; the Computer Misuse Act rule holds: no action ever touches a system we do not own.

Depends on: 2.1–2.3 (agents on hosts), 1.2 (auth for agent commands).


Phase 5 · Notifications and escalation (≈7 days)

Goal: the right person hears about it on a channel they actually read (plan section 9).

# Feature Detail Days
5.1 Telegram live Test with a real bot; buttons tied to the operator’s Telegram account; delivery receipts. 1
5.2 Email SMTP with signed links for Approve / Reject (short-lived, single-use). 1.5
5.3 Microsoft Teams / Slack Adaptive cards / Block Kit with the same buttons. 2
5.4 SMS and voice call Via a provider such as Twilio for Critical only (costs money per message; needs budget approval). 1
5.5 Escalation policy editor Who gets what at Amber / Red / Critical, reminder interval, quiet hours, backup contact when the on-duty person is on leave. 1.5

Done when: an unacknowledged incident reaches the operator, then the team lead, then management, on at least two channels, and every delivery and acknowledgement is in the audit chain.

Depends on: 1.2, 1.4.


Phase 6 · Accountability and evidence reporting (≈9 days)

Goal: reports that protect the company and treat staff fairly (plan section 10), and that answer the PDPC’s question: did the organization make reasonable security arrangements?

# Feature Detail Days
6.1 Security Evidence Report (PDF) Done in the MVP: renamed from the old negligence report, PDF export with the audit-chain proof. 1.5
6.2 Signed audit chain Ed25519 signature on each chain head; periodic external timestamp (RFC 3161) so even an admin with DB access cannot rewrite history unnoticed. 2
6.3 Fair-process features Operator can add context before a report is final; report shows the operator’s alert load at the time (so an overloaded person is not blamed for a staffing problem); HR-sensitive fields visible only to Executive/Auditor roles. 2
6.4 Team metrics Mean time to acknowledge and to resolve, SLA compliance, alerts per person, per week and per month. 1.5
6.5 Board / PDPA report Monthly summary for management: risk trend, incidents, response times, open risks, mapped to the PDPA Protection Obligation. 1.5
6.6 Privacy of monitoring Data retention settings, staff notice template, and a short data protection impact assessment for monitoring employees’ actions. 0.5

Done when: a sample monthly board report and a sample incident evidence report can be handed to a PDPC-style reviewer without explanation; signature verification detects any altered record.

Depends on: 1.1, 1.4, 5.x.


Phase 7 · Agents as separate services (≈12 days)

Goal: turn the agent design (plan section 12) from classes in one process into independent services, so a compromise of one agent cannot approve its own actions.

# Feature Detail Days
7.1 Message bus Redis Streams or NATS between Warden and the agents; events and proposals as typed messages. 3
7.2 Agent identity Each agent has its own key and permissions; Garrison can only execute signed, Countersign-approved actions. 2
7.3 Countersign as a separate service True two-key rule: Countersign runs apart from Warden, with its own key and policy file. 2
7.4 Watchdog for agents Heartbeats from every agent and collector; alert when any goes silent or is tampered with. 1
7.5 HelpDesk chat Operators ask “why was this blocked?” in Telegram/Teams; Claude answers only from the incident record and audit chain. 2
7.6 Per-agent budgets and limits Token and action budgets per agent; pause on overspend. 2

Done when: stopping Countersign stops all autonomous actions (fail-safe), and no single agent key can both propose and approve.

Depends on: 1.x, 4.1.


Phase 8 · Product, pilot and security of SentrAI itself (≈21 days)

Goal: a first real customer, and confidence that SentrAI is not itself the weakest link.

# Feature Detail Days Owner
8.1 Threat model of SentrAI What if core, an agent or the dashboard is compromised? Least privilege for agents, secret storage, signed updates. 2 Erick
8.2 Installer Single command install (Docker Compose and a Windows installer); onboarding wizard for assets, contacts and thresholds. 4 Erick
8.3 Multi-tenant option One SentrAI serving several small organizations (for an MSP), with strict tenant isolation. 5 Erick
8.4 Independent pentest and SBOM External test of SentrAI; software bill of materials; dependency pinning. 2 + vendor Erick, Ishmail
8.5 Pilot One Singapore private education institution or SME, read-only first (monitor + alerts), containment enabled only after 2 weeks of tuning. 5 Ishmail
8.6 Pricing and packaging Per-endpoint or per-organization pricing aimed below one security hire; compare with MDR services. 1 Ishmail
8.7 Documentation site Setup, admin, operator and auditor guides on GitHub Pages. 1 Hozen
8.8 Compliance mapping Map features to PDPA obligations and CSA’s Cyber Essentials / Cyber Trust marks for the sales story. [CHECK] requirements against CSA. 1 Hozen

Done when: the pilot runs for 30 days with agreed accuracy and response-time targets, and the pentest has no open high-severity findings.


Differentiators and where they are built

Why someone picks SentrAI Built in
One product for small teams: detect, escalate, temporarily fix, prove P2, P4, P5, P6
Risk grows with inaction, so ignored alerts get louder MVP; tuned in P1.3
Every automatic fix expires unless a human keeps it MVP; real enforcement in P4
Evidence built for the PDPC’s “reasonable security arrangements” question P6
Two-key autonomous actions (Countersign) and no hack-back, ever MVP; hardened in P7
Fair to staff: context, workload and role-based visibility P6.3

Risks and how we handle them

Risk Effect Mitigation
False positives trigger blocks Lost trust, blocked customers P3 accuracy gates; protected assets; TTL; pilot starts read-only
Staff see it as surveillance / blame Pushback, HR issues P6.3 fair-process features; reframe as evidence; staff notice
SentrAI itself is compromised Attacker gets an enforcement tool P7 separate keys, P8.1 threat model, P8.4 pentest
Jev API cost or outage Classification slows or stops Time budget and fallback already in the MVP; cost tracking in P3.1
One developer Schedule slips Critical path only (P1 → P2 → P4 → P8); other phases are optional for the pilot
Legal questions on active defense Liability No action outside our own perimeter (P4 done-when); legal review before the pilot

Team owners

Member Owns
Erick Sientaro (Developer) Phases 1–7 build, 8.1–8.4
Ishmail (CEO) Pilot, pricing, partner and customer conversations, competitor slide
Hozen (Notetaker) Docs site, compliance mapping, meeting notes, keeping this roadmap current

Last updated: 28 Sep 2026.